Information Security and Digital Forensics in the world of Cyber Physical Systems by Jones, Andrew et al.
Research Archive
Citation for published version:
Andrew Jones, Stilianos Vidalis, and Nasser Abouzakhar, 
‘Information security and digital forensics in the world of cyber 
physical systems’, Digital Information Management (ICDIM), 
paper presented at the 11th International Conference in Digital 
Information Management, Porto, Portugal, 19-21 September 
2016.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDIM.2016.7829795
Document Version:
This is the Accepted Manuscript version. 
The version in the University of Hertfordshire Research Archive 
may differ from the final published version.  
Copyright and Reuse: 
© 2016 IEEE.
Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE 
must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future 
media, including reprinting/republishing this material for 
advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective 
works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of 
any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
Enquiries
If you believe this document infringes copyright, please contact Research & 
Scholarly Communications at rsc@herts.ac.uk
Information Security and Digital Forensics in the 
world of Cyber Physical Systems 
 
Andrew Jones 
Cyber Security Centre,  
University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK 
Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University,  
Perth, Australia  
andy1.jones@btinternet.com 
 
 
Stilianos Vidalis 
Cyber Security Centre,  
University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK 
s.vidalis@herts.ac.uk 
 
Nasser Abouzakhar 
Cyber Security Centre,  
University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK 
n.abouzakhar@herts.ac.uk 
 
Abstract— The security of Cyber Physical Systems and 
any digital forensic investigations into them will be highly 
dependent on data that is stored and processed in the 
Cloud.  This paper looks at a number of the issues that will 
need to be addressed if this environment is to be trusted to 
securely hold both system critical and personal 
information and to enable investigations into incidents to 
be undertaken. 
Keywords— Digital Forensics, InformationSecurity, Cyber 
Physical Systems, Big Data 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As computing technology is incorporated into an ever 
widening range of applications that affect our everyday lives 
(Instagram, Google, Spotify, Uber, Seamless…), users are 
increasingly being asked to trust that it (the technology) will 
function correctly and that information that they provide, or 
that is collected about them, will be adequately protected. 
Menou (1995), as cited in [1], described information as “a 
product, which encompasses information as thing, as object, as 
resource, as commodity, what is carried in a channel 
(including the channel itself), the contents.” Given today’s 
socially-driven knowledge-centric virtual-computing era 
specific attributes such us interconnectivity, information 
exchange speed, and social impact, coupled with the lack of 
cyber-ethics, there is a need to expand the definition to include 
the concepts of ‘community’ and ‘environment’, addressing 
the different types of computing devices (e.g. smart phones, 
smart embedded devices, game consoles, laptops, computers, 
etc.) and a domain that goes beyond the concept of the term 
“cyber-domain”. For the purposes of this paper we will use the 
term Information Environment (IE). The U.S. Department of 
Defence (DoD) has defined the Information Environment (IE) 
in [2], as “... the information environment is the aggregate of 
individuals, organizations and systems (resources) that 
collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.” This 
definition can also be used for describing the Internet of 
Things (IoT), which consists of everyday objects that have 
uniquely identifiable embedded processors that are connected 
to the Internet. 
The average person typically currently thinks of the types 
of objects that will be connected to the IoT as the fridge, the 
coffee maker or the washing machine. In reality there are a 
huge number of devices and applications that are already in 
use (to do things such as monitoring babies and toddlers, 
managing medicine usage, tracking personal activity levels, 
monitoring aging family members, e-Health and remote 
doctors, controlling kitchen appliances, controlling smart 
home sensors, controlling smart cities, navigation, tracking 
assets and may others).  In the near future, the interconnection 
of such embedded devices is expected to enable automation in 
nearly all fields, including applications such as Smart Grids, 
integrated transport systems and Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks 
(VANETs). 
In this paper we look at the range of issues that must be 
considered when securing data used in these systems and the 
issues that will be faced when attempting to carry out a digital 
forensic analysis either as part of a criminal investigation or as 
part of an audit. 
II. CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
A cyber physical system (CPS) is a system of collaborating 
digital systems that are controlling physical entities. A range 
of cyber physical systems already exist in areas such as 
aerospace, the automotive industry, chemical processes, the 
civil infrastructure, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, 
transportation, entertainment and consumer appliances. The 
current generation of devices normally consists of embedded 
systems, communications links and computers that are used to 
coordinate the activities of the individual entities. At the 
current time, two of the more obvious and visible 
manifestations of this in the UK are the Docklands light 
railway in London and the pod system at Heathrow airport 
terminal 5. 
In the UK many of the major cities, including Milton 
Keynes, Birmingham and Glasgow are looking to develop 
intelligent transport systems in order to address the ever 
increasing problem of congestion in the existing transport 
systems. Overseas, places such as Abu Dhabi in the UAE have 
plans for a ‘smart city’ by 2030, which will see the 
introduction of a number of new transport modes in order to 
reduce the Emirate’s reliance on the car. This will be achieved 
by implementing a network of public transport systems, 
including high speed rail and rapid transit options, such as 
trams and buses, as well as initiatives for walking and cycling.  
Cyber physical systems, by definition, are real-time, 
intelligent, adaptive and predictive networked or distributed 
systems that produce and use a range of data inputs, with or 
without human interaction/intervention, to enable them to 
operate, and while most of the data will belong to the 
individual objects, there will often be links back to a 
person/user/customer in some form or another. Whether data 
refers to an ‘object’ or a ‘person’ they will overlap, 
interconnect and much of their value will be derived from 
these connections and interrelationships. As a result, issues 
that affect personal data such as trust, security and privacy are 
just as important in the CPS as they are in other aspects of 
computing. This in itself is an issue for concern. As reported 
in [3], there is still no singular privacy law  (The European 
Union General Data Protection Regulation was not enacted at 
the time of writing). Coupling this with the attributes of the 
IoT as an Information Environment for CPSs, one can argue 
that there is a very real problem with a potentially serious 
impact towards the prevention and prosecution of cyber-crime. 
It is increasingly clear that the security of Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPS) and Big Data must be dealt with in tandem as 
the one relies heavily on the other.  The issues that both the 
CPS themselves, and the Big Data that they rely on, also have 
to be addressed together when any attempt is made to put in 
place an effective and appropriate level of security or carry out 
a forensic investigation of an information environment such as 
the IoT. 
In addition to the IoT devices and CPS systems collecting, 
storing and processing data about entities and their 
environment, they are also doing the same with data about 
users/customers. This in itself is not a major problem, as there 
are many other systems that are doing the same thing, from 
banks and financial institutions to supermarkets and social 
networking websites. However, with each of the 
aforementioned examples, the user provides information to a 
known entity for a specific purpose and will sign an agreement 
(even if they don’t read it) with regard to what that data can be 
used for.   
When we start to look at integrated transport systems that 
manage perhaps road, rail and air transport, the issue starts to 
become more complex.  In order for these integrated systems 
to operate efficiently, to give user satisfaction and to allow the 
service to be personalised to the user, they will have to collect 
varying levels of information about the user.  For example, in 
an integrated transport system, it may be necessary for the 
system to know who the customer is, for card payment or so 
that their preferences can be used to personalise their journey. 
The systems will capture details of the customer’s journey, 
perhaps across several modes of transport, and may use this 
information to enhance the experience of the service provided 
by adjusting the environment of the vehicle (perhaps the 
temperature of the pod or by playing music that the user has 
previously indicated that they like). The information may also 
be used to adjust the speed or route of the vehicle to ensure 
that it reaches its destination to enable an easy and timely 
connection to another mode of transport. 
The personal information will be used together with data 
from a wealth of other sources such as traffic and 
environmental sensors, power monitors and vehicle operating 
sensors in order to make the system work efficiently and 
safely. The issue relating to trust, security and privacy is not 
one single system managing a dataset of personal data, but a 
number of systems working collaboratively, combining a 
number of different and disparate datasets in order to use 
extracted knowledge in non-authorised ways. 
III. SECURITY 
Naturally, in order for integrated transport systems to 
operate effectively, there will be a need to collect and process 
vast amounts of data from a large number of sources, some of 
which will belong to the entity that is operating the system and 
many more from, and owned by, external agencies.  The 
systems will have a high level of complexity and it is only 
when the data is fused that it will fully serve the requirements. 
According to [4], “a system is defined as a regularly 
interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified 
whole”. 
One of the security issues that will have to be considered is 
how the personally identifiable information (PII) will be 
protected. While individual systems might be adequately 
securing PII, this might not be the case when they get 
connected to a system of systems. Historically, security 
controls have been failing were there were interconnections or 
system merges. The issue is twofold: functionality and 
boundaries changing type. A boundary of a system is the point 
where the system is receiving or sending information to 
processes outside its control. 
Another security issue is that of data aggregation. While an 
individual may be happy to provide information for use on the 
individual elements of the integrated system, the majority of 
them will be unaware of the potential effect of the aggregation 
of this data over the different elements of the system and over 
time.  From the point of view of the owners of the integrated 
transport system, the personal information is important for use 
in billing, service optimisation and service delivery.  The user 
has no option but to provide some information, as payment in 
cash may be problematic or not possible, and in order to get 
the best experience and personalisation from the service.  The 
individual elements of information provided may have little 
value, but when they are combined, over a period of time, they 
could allow for a significant profile of an individual to be 
created, such as their travelling patterns and the locations they 
visit, their current location, their preferences, the people they 
travel with etc. to be revealed. 
From the early planning stages of this type of integrated 
system, the ownership and protection of this type of 
information needs to be considered, not only in the area of the 
storage and processing of the information, but also in the 
communication of it. 
To understand the full extent of the security issues we will 
use Samsung Electronics UK as an example. Going back to 
the integrated and intelligent semi-autonomous and 
personalised transport system that we described in the 
previous section, customers may user their smart devices 
(smart-phones) for their interaction with the system. Activities 
such as authentication, purchase of tickets/goods, 
personalisation of experience, evaluation and feedback, 
itinerary management will be conducted using the phone, on 
the go, when and where the customer is, around the clock, 
without the need of a human operator on the other side. 
According to [5], Samsung processes customer and supplier 
information relating to: 
• Personal details, 
• Family details, 
• Lifestyle and social circumstances, 
• Education and employment details, 
• Financial details, 
• Goods and services 
• Furthermore, Samsung states they process sensitive 
classes of information that includes: 
• Racial and ethnic origin, 
• Religious and other beliefs, 
• Trade union membership, 
• Physical and mental health details, 
• Offences and alleged offences, 
• Visual images, personal appearance and behaviour, 
• Criminal proceedings and behaviour. 
One could question the ethical reasoning behind the data 
Samsung collects and analyses, but this would be beyond the 
scope of this paper. The aforementioned personal data is a 
rather significant element of the total amount of data collected 
within the Samsung systems, and if not adequately protected, 
could allow for an individual to be tracked, or for their 
personal information to be stolen or modified. Fusing and 
datamining the mobile phone dataset (which is part of the data 
that Samsung is in control of) with the aforementioned 
transport and travel dataset discussed in the previous section 
and one could argue that every single person travelling in 
London could be extensively and continuously tracked and 
profiled, both in the virtual world and the physical world. 
IV. BIG DATA 
The volumes of data that will be produced by a range of 
sources; the integrated, processed and stored data to enable a 
CPS to work effectively, will be huge.  A term which is 
increasingly being used to describe the large volume of data - 
both structured and unstructured – is ‘Big Data’.  Big data can 
have a significant value in itself and can also be analysed for 
insights that allow for better situational awareness and lead to 
better strategic business decisions. 
The whole field of ‘big data’ and big data analytics and 
data mining is developing at a rate to meet the needs of large 
and complex systems.  Big data has three main characteristics, 
known as the 3 ‘v’s: Velocity, which describes the speed with 
which data comes in and out; Volume, which describes the 
ever increasing quantity of data; and Variety, which describes 
the range of data sources and types. 
An article in [6] in March of 2014 gave an insight into the 
value of big data when it stated:  ‘that data analysis produces 
uncannily accurate results; that every single data point can be 
captured, making old statistical sampling techniques obsolete; 
that it is passé to fret about what causes what, because 
statistical correlation tells us what we need to know; and that 
scientific or statistical models aren’t needed because, ….with 
enough data, the numbers speak for themselves’. 
According to another report from [7], ‘there are five main 
ways in which using big data can create value. First, big data 
can unlock significant value by making information 
transparent and usable at much higher frequency. Second, as 
organizations create and store more transactional data in 
digital form, they can collect more accurate and detailed 
performance information on everything from product 
inventories to sick days, and therefore expose variability and 
boost performance. Leading companies are using data 
collection and analysis to conduct controlled experiments to 
make better management decisions; others are using data for 
basic low-frequency forecasting to high-frequency nowcasting 
to adjust their business levers just in time. Third, big data 
allows ever-narrower segmentation of customers and 
therefore much more precisely tailored products or services. 
Fourth, sophisticated analytics can substantially improve 
decision-making. Finally, big data can be used to improve the 
development of the next generation of products and services. 
For instance, manufacturers are using data obtained from 
sensors embedded in products to create innovative after-sales 
service offerings such as proactive maintenance (preventive 
measures that take place before a failure occurs or is even 
noticed).’ 
However, ‘big data’ can bring with it its own problems 
and, as with many other uses of technologies, big data 
solutions are being used in ways that were never intended by 
their developers. By its very nature, big data tends to exist in 
systems with a distributed architecture. Because most of the 
data that is used is unstructured and security is not inherent in 
many of the data sources (as already discussed in a previous 
section), both organisations and vendors have to retrofit security 
into the systems that they use, and historically, vendors did not 
design security controls for distributed knowledge-based 
computing architectures.  
The handling and protection of those elements of personal 
data, which will undoubtedly only form a very small subset of 
the overall picture, will need to be adequately addressed 
throughout their whole lifecycle. The designers of such 
systems, on top of everything else (scalability and complexity 
management, modularity and synthesis, interfacing with 
legacy systems, time synchronisation, validation and 
verification) will need to consider how this will be achieved 
and who will be responsible for these elements of data in a 
hugely complex system that is highly interconnected across 
the Internet. 
A growing number of organisations are now using the 
concept of big data to store and analyse petabytes of data in 
order to gain better insights into their customers and also their 
own business in order to optimise the services and products 
that they offer and to ensure that they operate as efficiently as 
possible.  As a result, the classification of the information has 
become essential.  Apropos, in order to carry out any 
reasonable classification of the information, its ownership 
must be known and appropriate metadata must be collected.  
For most organisations, the ability to achieve sensible 
classification of data has either not been a priority or the 
ability to do so has eluded them to date. In 2011, the authors 
conducted data classification operations under a UK 
Government funded project. As an indication, we could 
acquire data at a rate of 150.37 MB/min. The de-duplication 
operation required 5 hours for 211.9GB and the indexing 
operation required 5 days for 149.4GB. It is understandable as 
to why the majority of the organisations have not as yet 
developed the capability for classifying data. Furthermore, if 
data classification is to be achieved, the ownership of both the 
raw data that is the input, as well as the outputs, must be 
known.  
This will be essential in order to adequately secure both 
the business critical data of the organisation and the personal 
data of the customers. It is only when you can identify all of 
your operation–critical assets and understand the 
interrelationships of their vulnerabilities that you can develop 
and deploy adequate security measures to protect them.  All of 
this will almost certainly have to be outsourced and take place 
in a cloud environment, as very few organisations will have 
the ability or desire to develop their own virtualised or 
physical infrastructure to deal with big data. 
V. DIGITAL FORENSICS OF CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
In a previous section we have argued that the PII that is 
used within any CPS will be a small part of a much larger 
dataset. Digital forensic practitioners and academics have, 
over the last few years, developed procedures and toolkits for 
recovering data related to their investigations from large data 
stores such as web farms and the cloud (see [8], [9], [10] and 
[11]). While much of this data is unstructured, such as email 
or documents, it is contained in a structured architecture. This 
means that it is possible to identify things such as an 
individual or group of webmail accounts or the cloud storage 
space used by a specific user.  In a CPS system, much of the 
PII may not be so easily isolated. 
Some (but by no means all) of the issues that will need to 
be addressed for a digital forensic investigation on the big data 
that will be part of a CPS include: the capture of the relevant 
elements of structured data sources, unstructured data sources, 
real time data and time sensitive data (that which only exists 
for a short period of time) and the relevant meta-data about the 
data.  Once the investigator has managed to do this, the next 
hurdle that they will need to overcome is that of correlating all 
of the disparate elements of information that they have 
gathered.  There are currently very few tools that are available 
to the investigator and as yet, this issue has not been the 
subject of any real level of research.  The reality is that there is 
going to have to be a rethink of what we consider to be digital 
forensics.  The scientific basics of digital forensics were given 
in a definition by the Digital Forensic Research Workshop in 
2001 as  “the use of scientifically derived and proven methods 
toward the preservation, collection, validation, identification, 
analysis, interpretation, documentation, and presentation of 
digital evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose 
of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events found 
to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized actions 
shown to be disruptive to planned operations.”  The current 
reality is that in forensic investigations of big data, the much 
sought after standards that was set out in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow (1993), which included evidentiary reliability, testing, 
error rate (is there a known error rate of the procedure?), 
publication (has the procedure been published and subject to 
peer review?); and acceptance (is the procedure generally 
accepted in the relevant scientific community?) is not 
currently achievable and is not likely to be so in the 
foreseeable future. 
Even in this difficult environment, organisations can put in 
place measures that would assist an investigation.  More than a 
decade ago, [12] produced a ten step process for forensic 
readiness and while the environment has changed, the steps 
outlined are still valid. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The use of CPS is increasing and will affect an increasing 
number of people. We accept that fusion and transportation of 
data is an essential element in these systems. We also accept 
that the majority of the people in modern societies are not 
particularly concerned about their data as long as they can 
happily and securely use technologies and commercial 
products to enhancing their social lives. In order to adequately 
protect the information that is used on these systems it is 
essential that security measures are considered from the design 
phase onwards. The ownership of both PII and business 
critical information must be determined and correctly 
classified at each stage of the data lifecycle so that it can be 
properly protected.  
We will turn the clock back to the 1990s when academics 
and practitioners alike were discussing the integrated supply 
chains and identified that the weakest link is the actor that will 
create a detrimental impact to the chain and its environment. 
Any system consists of a number of subsystems. Security 
standards must be adhered to by every subsystem. Boundaries 
must be clearly defined, associated stakeholders must be 
identified, and security controls must be implemented (and 
appropriately managed) throughout the lifetime of the systems 
and of the datasets. We are not suggesting that we reinvent the 
wheel. We are suggesting we should adopt best practice 
developed in other application domains into the CPS domain. 
Finally, any digital forensic investigation is likely to be 
time consuming and complex and will continue to be 
hampered by the current lack of effective tools to deal with 
these complex and distributed environments unless 
considerable research into the discussed issues is carried out. 
There will also need to be significant effort made in the 
development of new regulations for governing CPS 
environment and regulating CPS stakeholders. 
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